Abstract. Certificateless cryptography introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson eliminates the key escrow problem inherent in identity based cryptosystems. Even though building practical identity based signcryption schemes without bilinear pairing are considered to be almost impossible, it will be interesting to explore possibilities of constructing such systems in other settings like certificateless cryptography. Often for practical systems, bilinear pairings are considered to induce computational overhead. Signcryption is a powerful primitive that offers both confidentiality and authenticity to noteworthy messages. Though some prior attempts were made for designing certificateless signcryption schemes, almost all the known ones have security weaknesses. Specifically, in this paper we demonstrate the security weakness of the schemes in [4], [2] and [14] . We also present the first provably secure certificateless signcryption scheme without bilinear pairing and prove it in the random oracle model.
Introduction
Traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) based cryptosystems allow any user to choose their own private key and the corresponding public key. The public key is submitted to a certification authority (CA), which verifies the users identity and issues a certificate linking the users identity and the public key. Thus, PKI based systems need digital certificate management that is too cumbersome to maintain. Shamir [11] introduced the notion of identity based cryptography (IBC) to reduce the burden on the CA. In IBC, the private key of a user is not chosen by the user, rather it is issued by a trusted authority called the private key generator (PKG) or the trust authority (TA) and the public keys are generated by arbitrary strings representing the users identities and thus avoiding the need for certificates altogether. IBC suffers from an inherent issue called the key escrow problem, i.e. since the PKG is responsible for the generation of the private keys of all the users in the system, it has the ability to recover confidential information meant for any user or sign instead of a legitimate user. Certificateless cryptography (CLC) was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] to address the key escrow problem, while avoiding the use of certificates and the need for a CA. The principle behind CLC is to partition private keys into two components: an identity based partial private key (known to the PKG) and a non-certified private key (which is unknown to the PKG). This technique efficiently combines the best features of IBC and PKI. A number of certificateless encryption and signature schemes derived from identity based encryption and signature schemes have been successfully constructed and were proven secure under various assumptions.
Signcryption which was proposed by Zheng [15] is a cryptographic primitive that provides authentication and confidentiality simultaneously, at a lower computational cost and communication overhead than signing and encrypting the message independently. A secure signcryption scheme should provide confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation and should provide insider security too, i.e. even if the sender's private key is compromised, an adversary should not be able to unsigncrypt the message and even with the receiver's private key, a forger should not be able to generate a fresh signcryption (As if generated by the same sender).
All the initial constructs for certificateless cryptosystem were based on bilinear pairing [3, 6, 12, 13, 8, 9] . The first certificateless cryptosystem without using bilinear pairing was proposed in the context of encryption by Beak et al. [3] . In general, certificateless cryptosystem is prone to key replacement attack because the public keys are not certified and anyone can replace the public key of any legitimate user in the system. The challenging task in the design of certificateless cryptosystem is to come up with a scheme which is secure even if the public key of the user is replaced. The excellent survey by Dent [7] gives a comprehensive overview of the design of provably secure certificateless encryption schemes.
To the best of our knowledge, there exist four ( [4] , [2] , [14] and [5] ) certificateless signcryption schemes (CLSC) in the literature. Among these four, [4] , [2] and [14] are pairing based and [5] uses pairing for public key verification alone. In this paper, we show the security weaknesses in [4] , [2] and [14] . We also present a provably secure certificateless signcryption scheme without pairing. Our scheme is the first provably secure certificateless signcryption scheme without pairing. The newly proposed CLSC scheme uses a key construct similar to that of [13] but uses a completely different approach for encryption. Any signcryption scheme is strongly secure if attacks by the insider is considered. Our security model considers insider security and we have proved the security of our scheme in the random oracle model. It is to be noted that signcryption schemes are not directly obtained by combining a digital signature scheme and an encryption schemes. The security requirements for signcryption schemes are entirely different from encryption and digital signatures. The notion of insider security comes into picture when we talk about signcryption. This is because the private information of the sender and the public information of the receiver is involved in signcryption schemes. Thus, the certificateless signcryption scheme presented here is not a trivial extension of a signature scheme clubbed with an encryption scheme.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give the definition for the computational assumptions, which we have used to prove our scheme.
A. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)) Let p, q be two primes such that q|(p−1), given g, g a ∈ {Z * p } 2 for unknown a ∈ Z * q , the DL problem in Z * p is to find a. Definition. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the DL problem in Z * p is defined as Adv
The DL Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv DL A is negligibly small.
Definition. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the CDH problem in Z * p is defined as Adv
The CDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv CDH A is negligibly small.
Framework of CLSC
A certificateless signcryption scheme is defined by the following seven probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
-CLSC.Setup: This algorithm takes the security parameter 1 κ as input and outputs the master private key msk, the master public key mpk and the system public parameters params. It is run by the KGC in to initialize the system. provides the system public parameters params, sender identity ID A , receiver identity ID B , the public keys P K A and P K B of the sender and the receiver, the sender's full private key s A and the message m ∈ M as input to this algorithm. The output is a signcryption c ∈ CT . (Note that M is the message space and CT is the ciphertext space). -CLSC.Unsigncrypt: The user U B provides the system public parameters params, the sender identity ID A , public key P K A , the receiver identity ID B , public key P K B and the full private key s B along with the signcryption c ∈ CT as input to this algorithm. The algorithm returns the message m ∈ M, if c is a valid signcryption of m from U A to U B . The algorithm outputs "Invalid", otherwise.
Security Model of CLSC
The confidentiality proof of any CLSC scheme can be viewed as an interactive game, namely IND-CLSC-CCA2 between a challenger C and an adversary A. Si,ilarly, the unforgeability proof of CLSC can be viewed as an interactive game namely EUF-CLSC-CMA, between a challenger C and a forger F. In both the IND-CLSC-CCA2 and EUF-CLSC-CMA games, A and F are given access to some or all of the following six oracles (depending on their type). These oracles are simulated by C:
-Partial Private Key Extract of ID A : C responds by returning the partial private key d A of the user U A to A. -Request Secret Value of ID A : If U A 's public key has not been replaced by A then C returns the user secret value y A to A. If U A 's public key was replaced by A, then C returns nothing to A. -Request Public Key of ID A : C responds by returning the current public key P K A of user U A to A.
(Because public keys are viable to change, C returns the current public key it has stored.) -Replace Public Key of ID A : The public key P K A for a user U A can be replaced with any value P K A provided by A. On getting P K A from A, C replaces the public key P K A of ID A with P K A . At any given time the current value of the user's public key is used by C in its computations or responses. -Signcryption of message m with ID A as sender and ID B as receiver: C responds with the signcryption c on message m with ID A as the sender and ID B as the receiver. Note that even if C does not know the sender's private key, C should be able to produce a valid ciphertext and this is a strong property of the security model also C uses the current public keys of ID A as well as ID B to perform the signcryption. -Unsigncryption of ciphertext c with ID A as sender and ID B as receiver: An unsigncryption query for ciphertext c and user U A as the sender and U B as the receiver is answered by C, by first decrypting c and then returning the corresponding message m. C should be able to properly unsigncrypt ciphertexts, even for those users whose public keys have been replaced or if the receiver private key is not known to C. This is a strong requirement of the security model. (Note that, C may not know the correct private key of the user whose public key is replaced. Still C can unsigncypt c by getting the corresponding secret value from A.)
For any certificateless signcryption scheme two types of attacks are possible. They are referred as Type-I and Type-II attacks in the literature. Under each type of attack, it is required to establish the confidentiality and unforgeability of the scheme. The attack by a third party, (i.e. anyone except the legitimate receiver or the KGC) who is trying to break the security of the system is modeled by Type-I attack. The confidentiality of CLSC under Type-I attack is established through an interactive game between the adversary A I and the challenger C, and an interactive game between the forger F I and the challenger C establishes the unforgeability under Type-I attack. The attack by a honest-but-curious KGC, who tries to break the security of the scheme is modelled by a Type-II attack. The confidentiality of the scheme under Type-II attack is established through an interactive game between the adversary A II and the challenger C. The unforgeability under Type-II attack is established through the game between the forger F II and the challenger C. Summary of Constraints: In summary, the security model distinguishes the two types of adversaries (resp. forgers), namely Type-I and Type-II with the following constraints.
-Type-I adversary A I (resp. forger F I ) is allowed to replace the public keys of users at will but does not have access to the master private key msk. -Type-II adversary A II (resp. forger F II ) is equipped with the master private key msk but is not allowed to replace public keys of any of the users.
Confidentiality: The security model to prove the confidentiality of a CLSC scheme with respect to Type-I adversary A I (IND-CLSC-CCA2-I) and Type-II adversary A II (IND-CLSC-CCA2-II) are given below: IND-CLSC-CCA2-I game for Type-I Adversary: A certificateless signcryption (CLSC) scheme is IND-CLSC-CCA2-I secure if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A I has non-negligible advantage in winning the IND-CLSC-CCA2-I game. A I is given access to all the six oracles defined above. It is to be noted that A I does not have access to the master private key msk. IND-CLSC-CCA2-I game played between the challenger C and the adversary A I is defined below: Setup: The challenger C runs the setup algorithm to generate the system public parameters params and the master private key msk. C gives params to A I while keeping msk secret. A I interacts with C in two phases: Phase I: A I is given access to all the six oracles described above. A I adaptively queries (adaptively means the current query may depend on the responses to the previous queries) the oracles consistent with the conditions for Type-I adversary (Described in the Summary of Constraints above). Challenge: A I generates two messages m 0 , m 1 of equal length, an arbitrary sender identity ID A and a receiver identity ID B , which satisfies the following constraints.
-A I can access the full private key of the sender ID A .
-A I has not queried the Partial Private Key corresponding to the receiver ID B .
A I sends m 0 , m 1 , ID A and ID B to C. C randomly chooses a bit b ∈ R {0, 1} and computes a signcryption c * with ID A as the sender and ID B as the receiver. Now, c * is sent to A I as the challenge signcryption.
Phase II: A I adaptively queries the oracles consistent with the constraints that A I should not query the partial private key of ID B and A I should not query for the Unsigncryption on c * with ID A as sender and ID B as receiver. 
Unforgeability: The security model to prove the unforgeability of a CLSC scheme with respect to Type-I forger F I (EUF-CLSC-CMA-I) and Type-II forger F II (EUF-CLSC-CMA-II) are given below: EUF-CLSC-CMA-I game for Type-I Forger: A certificateless signcryption scheme CLSC is Type-I, EUF-CLSC-CMA secure if no probabilistic polynomial-time forger F I has non-negligible advantage in winning the EUF-CLSC-CMA-I game. A Type-I forger F I is given access to all the six oracles defined above. The EUF-CLSC-CMA-I game played between the challenger C and the forger F I is defined below: Setup: C runs the setup algorithm to generate the master private key msk and public parameters params. C gives params to F I while keeping msk secret. Training Phase: F I is given access to all the six oracles. F I adaptively queries the oracles consistent with the constraints for Type-I forger (Stated in the Summary of Constraints). Forgery: F I outputs a signcryption c * and a sender identity ID A , for which F I has not queried the partial private key. F I wins the EUF-CLSC-CMA-I game if c * is a valid signcryption with ID A as the sender and ID B as the receiver, also c * was not the output of any signcrypt query on the corresponding message m with ID A as the sender and ID B as the receiver. EUF-CLSC-CMA-II game for Type-II Forger: A certificateless signcryption scheme is Type-II, EUF-CLSC-CMA secure if no probabilistic polynomial-time forger F II has non-negligible advantage in winning the EUF-CLSC-CMA-II game. A Type-II forger is given access to all the six oracles. EUF-CLSC-CMA-II game played between the challenger C and the forger F II is same as EUF-CLSC-CMA-I with the constraints for Type-II Forger (Stated in the Summary of Constraints).
Certificateless Signcryption Scheme of Barbosa et al.
In this section, we give the review and attack of the certificateless signcryption scheme by Barbosa et al. [4] .
Review of Barbosa et al. Certificateless signcryption scheme
This scheme uses a symmetric bilinear group description Γ which is defined with two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 of same order q and an admissible pairingê :
The four cryptographic hash functions used in the scheme are :
Here, n is the maximum number of bits in a message. The master secret key s is selected uniformly at random from Z p , and the master public key P pub = sP . The public parameters of the system are params= Γ, P, P pub , q, n,
The partial private key extraction algorithm on input (ID, s) returns D = sH 1 (ID) = sQ. The user key generation algorithm returns a random element x ∈ Z p as the secret value, and P K = xP as the public key of user with identity ID. The full private key of user with identity ID is S = (x, D). Message, ciphertext and randomness spaces are {0, 1} κ , G 1 × {0, 1} κ × G 1 and Z p respectively.
-The ciphertext c is of the form (U, V, W ).
-H = H 3 (U, V, ID S , P K S ) and H = H 4 (U, V, ID S , P K S ) -If the check e(P pub , Q S )e(U, H)e(P K S , H ) ? = e(P, W ) fails, return Invalid".
Note: The certificateless signcryption scheme uses an Encrypt-then-Sign approach. A common randomness is shared between the signature and encryption components in the scheme to bind them together.
Attack on Barbosa et al. Certificateless signcryption scheme
The scheme proposed by Barbosa et al. in [4] is existentially forgeable. The scheme uses the Encrypt-then-Sign approach with public verifiability of ciphertext. The intuition behind the attack: for any signcryption scheme following the Encrypt-then-Sign approach, the identity of the sender should be bound to the encryption and the identity of the receiver should be bound to the signature. In [4] , the authors have achieved this binding by using a common randomness for encryption and signature independently but they failed to bind the receiver to the signature. This led to the attack on existential unforgeability of [4] . The attack is shown below.
-During the unforgeability game (Both type-1 and type-2), the forger requests a signcryption on a message m from ID * S to a arbitrary user with identity ID A . -Let the signcryption of m from ID * S to ID A be c = (U, V, W ).
-Now, the forger submits c * = (U, V, W ) as a signcryption from user ID * S to ID * R , where ID * S is the target sender identity for which the forger is not allowed to know the private key (partial private key for Type-I and user private key for Type-II forgers respectively) and ID * R is the new receiver identity. Note that c * is a valid signcryption of some random message m
is the key used for encrypting the message m from ID * S to ID A during signcryption. -The signature W will pass the verification because none of the components of the H and H are altered.
The correctness of the signcryption is straight forward as follows.
e(P pub , Q S )e(U, H)e(P K S , H ) = e(P, W )
where
So the challenger will accept c * as a valid forgery on message m
4 Certificateless Signcryption Scheme of Diego et al.
In this section, we give the review and attack of the certificateless signcryption scheme by Diego et al. [2] .
Overview of the Scheme
Diego et al.'s CLSC scheme [2] consists of five algorithms namely: Setup, Extract, Keygen, Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt, which we describe below.
-Setup. Let κ be the security parameter. The KGC performs the following to set up the system.
• The KGC selects cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 and G T of same order q with generators P ∈ R G 1 and Q ∈ R G 2 .
• Selects the master secret key s ∈ R Z * q and the master public key is set to be P pub = sP .
• Selects an admissible pairingê :
• Computes g =ê(P, Q).
• Selects three hash functions
Here n is the length of the message.
• The public parameters of the scheme are set to be params = q,
-Extract. Here, ID A is the identity of the user U A , the KGC computes the partial private key of user U A as follows.
• Computes the hash value y A = H 1 (ID A ) and the partial private key
• The KGC sends D A to the user U A via a secure authenticated channel.
-Keygen. User U A computes the full private key by performing the following steps:
• Chooses x A ∈ R Z * q as the secret value.
• Computes the full private key
• Computes the public key as P A = x A (y A P + P pub ) ∈ G 1 .
• It is to be noted thatê(P A , S A ) = g.
-Signcrypt. Inorder to signcrypt the message m to the receiver U B , the sender U A does the following:
• Chooses r ∈ R Z * q , computes u = r −1 and U = g u .
• Computes c = m ⊕ H 2 (U ), R = rP A and S = uP B .
• Computes h = H 3 (c, R, S) and T = (r + h)
Finally, the sender outputs the signcryption on message m as σ = c, R, S, T .
-Unsigncrypt. Inorder to unsigncrypt a ciphertext σ, the receiver U B does the following:
• Computes U =ê(S, S B ).
• Recovers the message as m = c ⊕ H 2 (U ).
• Checks whetherê(R + h P A , T ) ? = g. If the check holds, then accepts m as the message, otherwise outputs Invalid.
Attack on the CLSC Scheme by Diego et al.
Type-I Forgeability: The Type-I adversary who is capable of replacing the public keys of all users and is not allowed to know the master private key can forge a valid signcryption on any message m, from any legitimate user U A to U B by performing the following:
-Let ID A be the identity of user U A .
-The adversary chooses r ∈ R Z * q , computes u = r −1 .
Finally, the forger outputs the signcryption on message m as σ = (c, R, S, T ) which is a valid signcryption on m from U A to U B .
Correctness: The signcryption σ, which is produced as forgery passes the verification test as shown below, e(R + hP A , T )=ê(rP − P + hh −1 P, uQ) =ê(rP, uQ)ê(−P + P, uQ) =ê(P, Q)ê(−P, uQ)ê(P, uQ) =ê(P, Q) = g This proves that the forgery generated is valid.
Type-I and Type-II Attacks on Confidentiality:
-Let σ * = (c * , R * , S * , T * ) be the challenge signcryption on message m b , b ∈ {0, 1} with ID A as the sender and ID B as the receiver.
-The adversary is capable of generating a new signcryption σ on the message m b (The message is same as in σ * ) with ID C as sender and ID B as receiver (Note that the adversary knows the private key of ID C ).
-σ is obtained by the adversary by performing the following:
• Sets c = c * .
• Computes R = r P C , where r ∈ R Z * q .
• Set S = S * .
The signcryption corresponding to this change is σ = c , R , S , T .
-Now, the adversary can query the unsigncryption oracle for the unsigncryption of σ (Note that this query is valid because σ is different from the challenge signcryption σ * ). -The unsigncryption oracle will give back the message m b since the key used in both σ * and σ are the same i.e., U =ê(S , S B ) =ê(S * , S B ) = U * and note that S = S =(m 0 or m 1 ) breaking the indistinguishability of the scheme. This attack can be performed by both Type-I and Type-II adversaties because the adversary does not require the master private key or even does not want to replace the public key.
5 Certificateless Signcryption Scheme of Chen-Huang et al.
In this section, we present the review and attack of the certificateless signcryption scheme by Chen-Huang et al. [14] .
Overview of the Scheme
The CLSC scheme of Chen-Huang et al. [14] consists of the following four algorithms.
-Setup. Given κ as the security parameter, the KGC does the following to setup the system parameters.
• The KGC selects G 1 , G 2 of same prime order q with a generator P ∈ R G 1 .
• Selects three cryptographic hash functions
n , where n is the size of the message.
• Computes T =ê(P, P ).
-Keygen. Let, ID A be the identity of the user U A . The KGC computes the partial private key of user U A as follows.
• Computes Q A = H 1 (ID A ) and the partial private key D A = sQ A ∈ G 2 .
• The KGC sends D A to the user U i via a secure authenticated channel. On receiving the partial private key D A , user U A computes his full private key by performing the following steps:
• U A chooses x A ∈ R Z * q as the secret value.
• Sets the full private key S A = x A , D A .
• The corresponding public key is P A = T x A ∈ G 2 .
-Signcrypt. Inorder to signcrypt the message m of length n to the receiver U B , the sender U A does the following:
• Chooses r, r 1 , r 2 ∈ R Z * q , computes R 1 = T r1 and R 2 = T r2 .
• Computes h = H 2 (m R 1 R 2 P A P B ).
• Computes U = r 1 P − hS A and u = r 2 − x A h.
• Computes K =ê(S A , Q B ) r T
x A B and W = rQ A .
• Computes c = H 3 (K) ⊕ m Finally, the sender outputs the signcryption on message m as σ = (c, u, h, U, W ).
• Computes K =ê(S B , W )T
x B
A .
• Retrieves the message as m = c ⊕ H 3 (K ).
• Checks whether h ? = H 2 (m ê(U, P )ê(Q A , P pub ) h ) T u P h A P A P B ). If the check holds, then accepts m as the message, otherwise outputs Invalid.
Attack on the CLSC Scheme by Chen-Huang et al.
In this section, we show that the certificateless signcryption scheme by Chen-Huang et al. does not provide confidentiality as well as unforgeability with respect to both Type-I and Type-II attacks.
Attack on Type-I and Type-II Confidentiality: The following attack is possible because the adversary is capable of altering the challenge signcryption without altering the message in it and is allowed to obtain the unsigncryption of the newly formed signcryption, which yields the message signcrypted in σ * . We explain the attack in detail now. On getting the challenge signcryption σ * = c * , u * , h * , U * , W * , (σ * is the signcryption of either message m 0 or m 1 from user U A to U B ) the adversary (Type-I and Type-II) is capable of generating a new ciphertext σ = c , u , h , U , W (signcryption of m 0 from user U C to U B ) as follows:
-Replace the public key of user U C with the public key of user U A .
-Sets c = c * and W = W * . -Chooses r 1 , r 2 ∈ R Z * q , computes R 1 = T r1 and R 2 = T r2 . -Computes h = H 2 (m 0 R 1 R 2 P C P B ).
-Computes U = r 1 P − h S C and u = r 2 − x C h . -Gets the unsigncryption of σ .
-If U nsigncrypt(σ ) = "m 0 " then the adversary outputs that σ * is the signcryption of m 0 (i.e. b = 0). -If U nsigncrypt(σ ) = "Invalid" then the adversary outputs m 1 (i.e. b = 1).
Note: This attack can be done by both Type-I and Type-II adversaries.
6 Certificateless Signcryption Without Pairing -CLSC.Setup(1 κ ): The KGC takes the security parameter 1 κ as input and performs the following for setting up the system:
• Chooses two big prime numbers p and q such that q|(p − 1).
• Selects an element g ∈ R Z
